Whether, in cases with multiple judgments fixing damages, 28 U. Whether, in a class action settlement providing injunctive relief not authorized by statute and releasing or impairing the money-damages claims of absent or objecting members, class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and the denial of the right to opt out as to the damages claims violate Rule 23 or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.(1) Whether Wayne State University (WSU), a unique, autonomous institution, free from all relevant state control, who receives a minority share of its funding from the State, and who is responsible for its own debts, is a “person” under the False Claims Act (FCA); and (2) whether WSU's Board of Governors, a creation of the State and a properly formed corporation in every respect, is a “person” under the FCA. Concepcion, that “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the . Whether, given that the state law's designated trier of fact concluded that the four petitioners were each ineligible for the death penalty under the state law, the state supreme court erred under the Double Jeopardy Clause as explained in Bullington v.Missouri, by remanding for further proceedings that could expose petitioners to the death penalty.Whether state no-surcharge laws unconstitutionally restrict speech conveying price information (as the Eleventh Circuit has held), or regulate economic conduct (as the Second and Fifth Circuits have held).(1) Whether a sufficiently tangible and concrete reputational injury meets the “collateral consequences” exception to the mootness doctrine, Carafas v.
Whether the fact that a pending appeal “played no significant role” in an appellant's voluntary conduct mooting a case, Alvarez v.
Smith, is entitled to controlling weight in determining whether a lower court judgment should be vacated, as a majority of courts of appeals have held; or whether a party must make an additional showing of compelling circumstances warranting vacatur, as the Tenth Circuit held in this case. § 3559 (as the First and Fourth Circuits hold), similarly to the closest analogous offense (as the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold), or sui generis based on the penalty actually imposed by the court (as the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits hold); and (2) whether the willfulness mens rea of criminal contempt requires the government to prove that the defendant's wrongful conduct was knowing (as the First and Eleventh Circuits hold), reckless (as the Fifth, Seventh, and D. Circuits hold), or negligent (as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits hold). determines if appellate jurisdiction is defeated by an error in the designation of the order to be reviewed.
Whether an arbitration clause that does not expressly address the availability of class or collective arbitration is sufficient to defer the question of the availability of class or collective arbitration to an arbitrator to decide. § 401, should be classified as a Class A felony under 18 U. Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by requiring a power of attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorney-in-fact can bind her principal to an arbitration agreement.(1) What, if any, deference is due an agency's interpretation when it predominately interprets terms of common law in which courts, not administrative agencies, have special competence; (2) whether the circuit court erred when it held, in contravention of this Court's long-standing definition of “common carrier,” that pilots who use the Internet to communicate are “common carriers” when those pilots do not earn a commercial profit or indiscriminately offer to share their travel plans with the general public, thus warranting remand; and (3) whether the circuit court erred in holding that the Federal Aviation Administration could, consistent with the First Amendment, lawfully discriminate against content-based Internet communications because of the message conveyed and the means chosen by pilots to convey it.(1) Whether it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as understood in Atkins v. Florida, for a State court to refuse to accept data from clinical interviews with persons who knew a death-sentenced prisoner during the “developmental period” where the uncontested testimony and scientific and clinical consensus finds such data to be useful in determining the second criteria for intellectual disability, i.e., adaptive functioning deficits; (2) whether it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as understood in Atkins and Hall, for a State court to impose a requirement that a death-sentenced prisoner present “normed data” from clinical instruments in order to prove the second criteria for intellectual disability under Atkins; and (3) whether it violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for a State court to create a novel requirement that a death-sentenced prisoner present “normed data” from clinical instruments in order to prove the second criteria for intellectual disability under Atkins, and impose that requirement to deny relief to a prisoner who had no notice of the requirement during his evidentiary hearing.(1) Whether, where an acquitted defendant contested multiple elements of the offense, was acquitted by a general verdict, and can demonstrate that the evidence of a particular element was constitutionally insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clause collaterally estops the government from prosecuting the defendant for another offense that also requires proof of that particular element; and (2) where an acquitted defendant contested multiple elements of the offense, what burden of proof must he shoulder to establish that a particular element was “necessarily decided” in his favor for purposes of collateral estoppel.(1) Whether, when the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs an arbitration, the FAA's judicial review standards apply in state court and preempt application of different state-law judicial-review standards; and (2) whether, when arbitrators have jurisdiction to resolve a contract dispute, the FAA prohibits a court from holding that they “exceeded their powers” based on the court's conclusion that their contract interpretation is “plainly” and “irrationally” incorrect on the merits.(1) Whether a federal court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction when a notice of appeal does not identify correctly the order to be reviewed, but the briefs resolve any potential confusion; (2) whether a federal court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction when an error in the designation of the order to be reviewed neither prejudices nor misleads the appellee; and (3) whether the more lenient standard of Foman v. Whether, where purchasers allege that a manufacturer misrepresented a drug's safety to prescribing doctors to increase sales, the presence of the doctors breaks the causal chain—for purposes of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act causation—between the misrepresentations and the purchasers' economic injuries. Maryland jurisprudence, a court may require a defendant to demonstrate that suppressed evidence “would have led the jury to doubt virtually everything” about the government's case in order to establish that the evidence is material.(1) Whether, under Brady v.
Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's church plan exemption applies so long as a pension is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan. infringe a valid and enforceable” patent extends to articles that do not infringe any patent; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in affirming the Commission's assessment of civil penalties for the domestic infringement of a patent that has been finally adjudicated to be invalid. § 1101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act – and therefore constitutes grounds for mandatory removal.(1) Whether a violation of the criminal contempt statute, 18 U. Maryland, courts may consider information that arises after trial in determining the materiality of suppressed evidence; and (2) whether, in a case where no physical evidence inculpated petitioners, the prosecution's suppression of information that included the identification of a plausible alternative perpetrator violated petitioners' due process rights under Brady. citizen may bring a Bivens claim in the absence of any other remedy when federal law enforcement officers unlawfully detain and grossly mistreat him during a criminal counterterrorism investigation abroad.
Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's church plan exemption applies so long as a pension plan is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.(1) Whether the International Trade Commission's jurisdiction over the importation of “articles that . Whether a conviction under one of the seven state statutes criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a twenty-one-year-old and someone almost eighteen constitutes an “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U. Whether Florida's nearly thirty-year-old Surcharge Statute is a facially unconstitutional speech restriction, as the Eleventh Circuit held, or whether such a law regulates only conduct and does not even implicate the First Amendment, as the Second and Fifth Circuits have held. Whether state no-surcharge laws unconstitutionally restrict speech conveying price information (as the Eleventh Circuit has held), or regulate only economic conduct (as the Second and Fifth Circuits have held).
Whether, under this Court's decision in Daimler AG v.Bauman, personal jurisdiction may be asserted over a corporate defendant only in the defendant's place of incorporation or principal place of business, except in extraordinary circumstances. that the arbitrator should decide ‘allegations of waiver,’” Howsam v.Whether the Multistate Tax Compact, a multistate agreement that addresses significant aspects of the state taxation of multistate businesses, has the status of a contract that binds its signatory States. § 1961(a) – which instructs that postjudgment interest should run from “the entry of the judgment” – requires federal courts invariably to begin running postjudgment interest from the first judgment, or whether courts may take into account other factors, such as the availability of prejudgment interest, in deciding from when postjudgment interest runs. allows the government to place an imprimatur on private advertising and thereby render the advertisement government speech, stripping it of all First Amendment protection.(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit properly concluded—in conflict with the decisions of other courts—that an arbitrator's refusal to refer a disqualification motion to a neutral decision maker, reliance on a party's disqualification motion as basis for imposing punitive damages, or other circumstances like those presented here, where the arbitrator's brother had served as lead counsel to petitioner's chief competitor in recent litigation against petitioner, does not establish “evident partiality” justifying vacatur of the award; and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit properly held—in conflict with the decisions of other courts—that an appellee waives an argument pressed in, but not passed on by, the district court by not advancing it as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment below.(1) Whether a federal court is required to tailor compensatory civil sanctions imposed under inherent powers to harm directly caused by sanctionable misconduct when the court does not afford sanctioned parties the protections of criminal due process; and (2) whether a court may award attorneys' fees under its inherent powers as sanctions against a client for actions by its attorney that are not fairly attributable to the client's own subjective bad faith.(1) Whether, given “the presumption . Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., a court violates the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) by presuming that allegations of waiver based upon a party's pre-arbitration litigation conduct should be decided by the court, not the arbitrator; and (2) whether, in light of the holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA,” the FAA preempts a state's waiver doctrine that categorically prohibits arbitration of abuse-of-process claims arising from prior litigation.You can select a particular conference (or the cases referred to the Solicitor General) below or click here to instead sort by the case's name. against [the losing party],” Declaratory Judgment Act Section 2202, or whether a declaratory judgment is only available to corporations and the upper class, who can afford to pay the hourly fees and expenses required for access to the courthouse; and (2) whether, if state law controls the issue of whether attorney's fees and expenses can be awarded for obtaining a declaratory judgment, the case should be remanded to the district court to consider Kansas state law on the subject because the district judge affirmatively stated that fees and expenses should be awarded if they legally could be.(Sorting by case name prompts display of the complete, searchable list of cases.) View this list sorted by case name. § 2254(d) permits a federal court to ignore the reasoning of the state court and substitute its own reasons for denying relief and whether the violent nature of the crime lessens the prejudice from unconstitutional shackling.(1) Whether this Court should retain the Auer v. § 106.33, which provides that a funding recipient providing sex-separated facilities must “generally treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity,” should be given effect.(1) Whether, if federal law controls the issue of whether attorney's fees and expenses can be awarded for obtaining a declaratory judgment, an award of fees and expenses is “necessary or proper relief . Whether a State may condition access to the wholesale or retail tier of its three-tier alcohol distribution system on in-state residency or physical presence, as the Second and Eighth Circuits have concluded, or whether such requirements are unconstitutional, as the Fifth Circuit held below.(1) Whether a district court commits plain error by enhancing a sentence based on a divisible statute without requiring the government to meet its burden of proving that the conviction arose under a qualifying prong of that statute, as five Circuits have held, or whether on plain-error review the burden instead shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show that the alleged predicate offense did not arise under a qualifying prong of the statute, as four Circuits have held; and (2) whether the district court's additional enhancement of Petitioner's sentence based on a second predicate offense under the crime of violence residual clause was error in this case because that clause is unconstitutionally vague.(1) Whether capital defense counsel may decide to present evidence of a single mitigating factor without having first conducted a thorough investigation of other potential mitigating factors and whether counsel's post-hoc concern about possible rebuttal evidence justifies the failure to investigate; and (2) whether, where a state court provides a reasoned decision denying relief, 18 U. Robbins doctrine despite the objections of multiple Justices who have recently urged that it be reconsidered and overruled; (2) whether, if Auer is retained, deference should extend to an unpublished agency letter that, among other things, does not carry the force of law and was adopted in the context of the very dispute in which deference is sought; and (3) whether, with or without deference to the agency, the Department of Education's specific interpretation of Title IX and 34 C. Whether, for purposes of the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the ordinary requirement for collateral estoppel that the prior determination was necessary to the ultimate outcome—which is intended to ensure that a determination received careful attention, and to deny preclusive effect where the outcome deprived a party of the opportunity for appellate review it otherwise would have had—applies to a jury's special findings in a capital case that the prosecution failed to prove certain alleged aggravating factors.